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Time-varying Investment Barriers and Closed-end Country 
Fund Pricing 
Abstract 
We examine the effect of time-varying investment barriers on the pricing of UK 
closed-end country funds. We find that a direct measure of capital market 
segmentation is significantly negatively related to both country fund stock return and 
Net Asset Value (NAV) return of the fund, but there is no relation to the premium. 
Also we find some evidence of a positive relation for one of our indirect barriers 
(inflation variability) and price, NAV and premium. Overall our results support an 
information hypothesis of the impact of investment barriers on closed-end fund 
pricing.  
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1. Introduction 
Closed-end country funds offer an opportunity for ‘stay-at-home’ investing 
abroad. But what happens when investment barriers make foreign investment less 
accessible? The traditional explanation associated with Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal 
and Wheatley, (1990) is that investment barriers have led to higher premiums1 as 
investors are willing to pay more to invest in an otherwise inaccessible market, 
raising the share price of the fund. However, as we are now in an era of liberalised 
markets, we suggest that an information hypothesis is more relevant, where investors 
respond negatively to information about increases in market inaccessibility. We 
argue that closed-end country fund pricing reflects the information asymmetries 
between home and foreign investors who are constantly adjusting to information both 
about their own markets and, in the case of the closed-end fund investor, about the 
foreign market. Extending the ‘information explanation’ of Froot and Ramadorai 
(2008) we argue that investors both at home and abroad respond positively 
(negatively) to the information conveyed by increases (decreases) in foreign market 
openness and that this affects both the country fund NAV return and in turn the share 
price return.  
Our paper further contributes by applying a time-varying measure for market 
segmentation. This approach has been used in different contexts (Kearney & Lucey, 
2004). Our approach is consistent with the arguments of Bekaert and Harvey (1995), 
who find that the liberalisation of equity markets is not a once-for-all occurrence. We 
use a time varying measure that indicates the proportion of the market that is 
                                                             
1 A premium results when the share price is above the NAV, and a discount (negative 
premium) occurs when the share price is below the NAV. Here we use one term ‘premium’ 
to refer to both positive and negative premiums (discounts). 
4 
 
inaccessible to foreigners.2 This measure has been found more recently by Bekaert et 
al. (2011) to be ‘the single most important economic explanatory variable, 
accounting for the largest share of the explained segmentation variance’ (p3877) in 
their study of market segmentation. de Jong & de Roon (2005) use a similar measure. 
Finally, we are also able to consider the impact of financial crises on investment 
barriers and pricing as our post-liberalisation time frame captures two major financial 
crises, the 1997 East Asian crisis and the 2008 financial crisis.  
 We hypothesise that increasing market segmentation affects closed-end 
country fund pricing in two ways. First, the value of the underlying assets decreases 
as local investors absorb the negative information being sent out by their markets. 
This results in a drop in the NAV. For a brief period there can be very high 
premiums (consistent with  Chandar and Patro, 2000; Frankel and Schmukler, 2000) 
but then the stock price adjusts downwards as domestic investors react to the loss in 
value of the underlying assets.  
We formulate the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: Direct investment 
barriers are negatively related to the closed-end fund stock price return. 2: Direct 
investment barriers are negatively related to the closed-end fund NAV return. 3: The 
closed-end fund premium is not significantly related to direct investment barriers. 
                                                             
2 To our knowledge this measure has only been used as a control variable in one previous 
study of closed-end funds (see Chan, et al. 2008).  
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We collect monthly data from Datastream on the complete sample of seventeen 
UK traded closed-end country funds investing in single emerging markets3 from 31 
December 1993 to 31 December 2009.  We define the closed-end fund premium, 
following Chan et al. (2008) as the difference between the natural log of the fund 
stock price and natural log of the NAV 
    𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀 ≡ 𝑙𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑉    (1) 
Direct investment barriers 
We use a time varying measure of investment restriction, the Edison and 
Warnock (EW) (2003) measure, to represent the level of capital control exercised by 
a country. This measure indicates the proportion of the stock market that is 
inaccessible to foreign investors. The scale for the EW measure ranges between 0 for 
an open market with no capital restrictions and 1 for a completely closed market.4 We 
appreciate that a situation could occur in which the overall market value of the market has 
increased without the investable portion increasing, giving the impression that there has been 
a relative increase in market restrictions. However, we feel it is reasonable to assume that the 
market value of stocks available for foreigners to invest in, as these are usually major 
companies and therefore likely to be among the most liquid, will increase along with the 
remainder of the market, and therefore the ratio will remain fairly constant.  
Indirect investment barriers 
                                                             
3 Generally the funds invest across the country stock market, except Sri Lanka where most of 
the fund was invested in tea plantations. The Israel Fund and Brazilian Investment Trust had 
to be excluded from the sample due to insufficient data. 
4 In November 2008 the S&P IFCG indices were continued as the new S&P Global BMI 
series and the S&P IFCI indices tightened their criteria to include only the most liquid stocks 
(those with a float-adjusted market capitalization of at least US$ 200m with a minimum 
value traded of $100m in the previous year, up from market capitalization of $100m and 
turnover of $50m since 1994).  
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Following Nishiotis (2004) we also examine the following three indirect 
investment barriers – illiquidity, inflation and lack of economic freedom on the stock 
price, NAV and premium. Others have also found a significant relation between 
political risk and pricing in emerging markets (Dimic, Orlov and Piljak, 2015). We 
adapt the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to proxy the monthly illiquidity of the 
foreign market: 
𝐶𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ |𝑅𝑐,𝑑|/𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑐,𝑑
𝐷𝑡
𝑑=1                                                                           (3) 
where CILLIQc,t is the illiquidity of market c at time t. The daily absolute return and 
daily sterling volume of country equity index c on day d are given by Rc,d and VOLc,d. 
We calculate the sterling volume of trading by multiplying the number of stocks 
traded, reported in thousands, by the price in sterling. We then aggregate these daily 
figures to give the monthly absolute return, which is divided by the monthly volume 
of trading in thousands of stocks and scaled by 10^3. Inflation variability (VINFL) is 
proxied by the standard deviation of the monthly inflat ion rate from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics using a 3 year rolling period ending in month t 
(Nishiotis, 2004).  We use the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney and 
Lawson, 2013) (Fraser Institute) measure to proxy for indirect barriers to economic 
freedom.. The index provides a rating out of 10 for the economic freedom and we 
then subtract it from 10 to give a measure of the lack of economic freedom, or the 
economic freedom barrier (EFB).  
2. Results 
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We begin by testing for a relation between the components of fund premium, i.e. 
the stock price and NAV, and the direct and indirect capital control barriers as shown 
below: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑓,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓    + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑊𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐹𝐵𝑐 ,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑐,𝑡 +
                   𝛽5𝑈𝐾𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑈𝐾𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 +  𝑢𝑓,𝑐,𝑡                                                      (4) 
where SPRETf,c,t is the return on the stock price of fund f from market c at time t, 𝛼𝑓 
is the fixed effects parameter, EW is the Edison and Warnock (2003) measure of 
capital control, CILLIQ is the country illiquidity measure, EFB is the economic 
freedom barrier measure, VINFL  is the variability of the inflation, UKMKT is the 
UK market return and UKPREM is the arithmetic average of the discount of UK 
funds investing in the UK. We use a fixed effects technique where each fund is 
allowed to have a fixed constant (𝛼𝑓 )  to take account of the heterogeneity in the 
funds.  
Insert Table 1 here 
3. Discussion 
In Table 1 Panel A all specifications show a significantly negative relation (at 
1% level of significance) between the fund stock price return and the level of capital 
control regardless of which indirect barrier is included. The relation is still 
significantly negative in the presence of the control variables (UKMKT and 
UKPREM). The results for the direct investment barrier are consistent with our 
information hypothesis , which is that in the post-liberalisation period, investors react 
negatively to the information conveyed by an increase in market inaccessibility.  
Table 1 Panel B shows that the NAV return, like the stock price return, is also 
strongly negatively related to the direct investment barriers (EW). This gives support 
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to our second hypothesis – that direct investment barriers are negatively related to the 
NAV return. We argue that when there is an increase in the EW measure (in other 
words when the value of the market accessible to foreigners decreases in relation to 
the entire country market) the market value of the assets the fund has invested in 
decreases, causing the NAV to decrease.  As mentioned above, as the measure is a 
ratio measure we can envisage a situation where the overall market increases in 
market value, but the restrictions are unchanged. However, we assume that the 
market value of the investable portion of the market will generally increase along 
with the inaccessible portion of the market. In crisis periods this may not occur and 
we consider these below. 
Table 1 Panel C presents the results of the regression of the closed-end fund 
premium with direct and indirect investment barriers. The results provide general 
support for our third hypothesis that in the post-liberalisation period, as there is no 
consistent relation between the premium and direct investment barriers. Our findings 
support those of Patro (2005) who finds that the announcement of loosening of 
investment restrictions has a positive effect on the closed-end fund net asset value, 
but no significant effect on the closed-end premium, as the price adjusts to the NAV. 
Our results are also compatible with the concept of temporary premium fluctuation 
due to sources of investor sentiment such as trades driven by foreign news events as 
in Klibanoff, Lamont and Wizman (1998); Hwang (2011). Andriosopoulos, Stelarios 
and Thomas (2014) also document the role of attention driven trades on the UK 
closed-end fund premium.  
We then regress the share price and NAV return for each fund against the 
change in the level of the EW measure. We include the control variables, this time 
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using the change in the UK market index and the change in the average UK domestic 
premium. In this way we test to see whether our previous results may be due to 
autocorrelation. We find that there is a significant relation between the share price 
return and change in EW measure for 5 out of 17 funds (at 5% or 1%) and between 
NAV return and change in EW measure for an additional 2 funds as well as the same 
5 funds (at 1%, 5% and 10%). (Results not reported). 
3.1 Robustness checks 
3.1.1 Robustness to control variables  
 We add a more extensive set of control variables to the regressions from 
Table 1. These include the foreign exchange appreciation rate, foreign market return 
and log of market value as well as the UK market return and the UK average 
premium. The tests with the additional control variables (not reported) do not change 
our main result i.e. a significantly negative relation between direct investment 
barriers (EW) and stock price/NAV.  
 It could be argued that our results are driven by the fact that our sample 
period includes two major crisis periods. Following the global financial crisis there 
were also changes to the S&P indices on which the Edison & Warnock (2003) 
measure is based. For this reason we rerun the tests for Table 1 using dummy 
variables for the East Asian Crisis in 1997-98, the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-
2008 and for the period following the index adjustment from November 2008 
onwards. Although we find significant dummy variables for the crisis periods, the 
results (not reported) are consistent with those of Table 1.  
3.1.2 Alternative segmentation measures - covariance with world market return 
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It could also be argued that our results are dependent on the measure of 
segmentation we used and that another measure might produce a different result. For 
this reason, we rerun the same panel data regressions, this time using the 24 month 
rolling covariance between the returns of the emerging market invested in by the 
fund and the world market return, a measure used by Nishiotis (2004).  
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 2 shows that the level of covariance between the emerging market 
invested in by the fund and the world market (RCOV) is significantly positively 
related to the stock price return of emerging market closed-end funds in every case. 
This shows that the greater the level of integration, the higher the return on the fund.  
3.1.3 Alternative segmentation measures  - Lane Milesi-Ferretti measure 
For further robustness we use the updated (2013) TOTAL measure: (Lane & 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007, 2013). The TOTAL measure represents the ratio of the 
country’s aggregate assets plus total liabilities to its gross domestic product. The 
issue with this measure is that it relates net foreign assets to GDP. We expect that as 
a country develops and becomes more open, foreigners increasingly invest in it and 
its foreign assets increase relative to its GDP. However, as it develops, the country 
can also be in a position to borrow more, and so the foreign liabilities will also 
increase, thus the two measures work in opposite directions. An alternative is to take 
two separate measures: the total foreign assets in relation to GDP and total foreign 
liabilities in relation to GDP. We regress fund stock price return, NAV return and 
premium first against TFA/GDP and then against TFL/GDP in Table 3. The results 
show a consistently significant relation between the fund and NAV return and both 
measures of country openness. This supports our previous findings that the fund and 
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NAV return are significantly related to measures of country openness. The more 
(less) open a country becomes, the higher (lower) is the fund (NAV) return of the 
corresponding closed-end country fund. In wider terms this gives support to the 
information hypothesis that investors respond positively to the information conveyed 
by greater market openness and that this is reflected in the pricing of the closed-end 
country fund. 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we find that direct measures of capital market segmentation are 
significantly negatively related to both country fund stock return and NAV return. 
The lower the level of capital control and the higher the level of integration, the 
higher the stock price and NAV return of UK closed-end funds in emerging markets. 
Our results support an information hypothesis, whereby investors are responding 
positively (negatively) to increases (decreases) in market accessibility. This points 
the way towards a richer understanding of the closed-end fund premium – examined 
less as an isolated puzzle and more as the fluctuating relation between the 
expectations of the domestic and foreign investor as they respond to changes in 
information.  
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Table 1: Panel Regression of Country Fund Stock Price Return, NAV Return and Premium with Direct 
and Indirect Investment Barriers  
Panel A: Stock price and 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EW -0.059 -0.058 -0.062 -0.060 -0.064 -0.060 -0.067 
 (-6.03)** (-5.94)** (-5.65)** (-6.20)** (-5.75)** (-4.86)** (-4.62)** 
CILLIQ  -0.000 -0.004     
  (-0.30) (-0.27)     
VINFL    0.000 0.000   
    (18.61)** (12.82)**   
EFB      0.004 0.005 
      (0.77) (0.67) 
UKMKT   0.130  0.130  0.013 
   (13.73)**  (14.51)**  (14.54)** 
UKPREM   0.001  0.000  0.000 
   (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.35) 
R-Sq 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.26 
No. of Observations 1814 1728 1728 1814 1814 1814 1814 
 
Panel B - NAV Return and 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EW -0.05 -0.52 -0.057 -0.054 -0.058 -0.06 -0.066 
 (-6.18)** (-6.21)** (-5.31)** (-6.47)** (-5.44)** (-5.43)** (-5.01)** 
CILLIQ  -0.001 -0.001     
  (-0.32) (-0.32)     
VINFL    0.000 0.000   
    (18.42)** (12.60)**   
EFB      0.010 0.010 
      (1.68) (1.50) 
UKMKT    0.011  0.011  0.011 
   (14.20)**  (15.14)**  (15.14)** 
UKPREM   0.000  0.001  0.001 
   (0.57)  (0.72)  (0.72) 
R-Sq 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.23 
No. of Observations 1797 1711 1711 1797 1797 1797 1797 
 
Panel C - Premium and 
Independent Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EW -0.14 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 0.016 -0.33 
 (-0.19) (-0.32) (-0.95) (-0.27) (-0.97) (0.2) (-0.42) 
CILLIQ  0.004 0.003     
  (0.97) (0.77)     
VINFL    0.000 0.001   
    (8.06)** (4.11)**   
EFB      -0.41 -0.04 
      (-1.30) (-1.39) 
UKMKT    0.002  0.002  0.002 
   (1.81)  (2.01)  (1.93) 
UKPREM   0.008  0.008  0.009 
   (2.49)*  (2.65)*  (2.94)** 
R-Sq 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.015 0.09 
No. of Observations 1644 1572 1572 1644 1644 1644 1644 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of closed-end fund stock price return, NAV (Net Asset 
Value) return and closed end fund premium on direct and indirect investment barriers and various control 
variables. 
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Table 2: Panel Regression of Country Fund Stock Price Return, NAV Return and Premium 
with World Market Covariance and Indirect Investment Barriers  
  Panel A: Stock Price Return Panel B: NAV Return Panel C: Premium 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
RCOV 5.00 4.63 4.33 4.99 4.59 4.51 0.15 0.89 -0.63 
  (2.88)* (2.83)* (2.53)* (3.03)** (3.20)** (2.90)* (0.04) (0.24) (-0.17) 
CILLIQ -0.04 
  
-0.04 
  
0.07 
    (-5.77)** 
  
(-6.33)** 
  
(5.15)** 
  VINFL 
 
-0.00 
  
-0.00 
  
0.01 
   
 
(-0.39) 
  
(-0.52) 
  
(0.76) 
 EFB 
  
-0.01 
  
-0.00 
  
-0.06 
  
  
(-1.22) 
  
(-0.26) 
  
(-2.55)* 
UKMKT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (10.36)** (10.79)** (10.78)** (10.35)** (10.88)** (10.83)** (2.29)* (1.77) (1.82) 
UKPREM -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (-0.07) (-0.42) (-0.32) (0.56) (0.79) (-0.30) (2.63)* (2.69)* (2.75)* 
  
         R-Sq 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.10 0.07 0.09 
No. of 
Observations 1749 1767 1767 1732 1750 1750 1593 1597 1597 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of closed-end fund stock price return, NAV 
return and premium on world market covariance, indirect investment barriers and various control 
variables.  
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Table 3: Panel Regression of Country Fund Stock Price Return, NAV Return and Premium with Lane Milesi-Ferreti Market Openness Measure 
  Panel A: Stock Price Return Panel B: NAV Return Panel C: Premium 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
TFA/GDP 1.25 0.98 
  
1.15 0.99 
  
0.10 0.23 
    (4.01)** (3.05)** 
  
(3.35)** (2.67)* 
  
1.54 2.97** 
  TFL/GDP 
  
0.87 0.70 
  
0.92 0.82 
  
0.09 0.17 
  
  
(2.40)* (2.01)* 
  
(2.75)* (2.48)* 
  
1.83 (3.72)** 
UKMKT 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
  
 
(-1.70) 
 
(-3.72)** 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-2.88)* 
 
(1.52) 
 
(1.06) 
UKPREM 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
  
 
(-2.31)* 
 
(-2.38)* 
 
(-1.58) 
 
(-1.46) 
 
(2.40)* 
 
(2.62)* 
  
            No. of Observations 161 161 161 161 163 163 163 163 153 153 153 153 
R-Sq 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.12 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions of closed-end fund stock price return, NAV return and premium on the two components of the 
Lane Milesi-Ferreti Openness Measure. 
 
